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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 42

BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW

BCL § 307.:

Court may extend time limit for proof of service.

Business Corporation Law § 307 contains a flaw in its provision for filing proof of service. Service upon a foreign corporation
unauthorized to do business in New York is effected by service
upon the Secretary of State and by registered mailing of notice to
the defendant. Proof of service, by affidavit and return receipt,
must be filed "within thirty days after such service. . " 136
However, if the receipt is not returned to the plaintiff within the
thirty days, he cannot possibly comply with the statute as worded.
Until the section can be appropriately amended, the best remedy,
as permitted in Sassand Ilio v. Calzaturificio San Giorgio,137 is to
allow the plaintiff to file the affidavit nunc pro tunc, as authorized
by CPLR 2004.138
GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW

GML § 50-e.:

Counterclaim barred by failure to comply with
90-day notice of claim.

Section 50-e of the General Muncipal Law provides that filing
a notice of claim within ninety days after the claim arises is a
condition precedent to the commencement of an action against a
municipality. This notice requirement is intended to protect governmental bodies from stale claims and to prevent fraud by permitting investigation while the evidence is still fresh. 39 40Early
notice also provides opportunity for out-of-court settlement.
However, where the municipality itself initiates the litigation,
it apparently has investigated the incident and is not interested
in a settlement. Thus, when the defendant asserts a counterclaim
arising out of the same incident, imposition of the notice condition
would seem unjustified in view of its purpose. Nevertheless, it
has been held that failure to notify within the ninety days is fatal
to a counterclaim even if it arises out of the same occurrence
136N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §307(d).
LAW § 52 and GEN. Bus. LAW § 250,

Contrast with VEHICLE & TR.AFFIc

models for the BCL section, whereby

proof of service must be filed within thirty days after the plaintiff obtains
the return receipt or other official proof of delivery. 6 MCIrNNEV'S BCL
§ 307, Legislative Studies and Reports 148 (1963).
13751 Misc. 2d 553, 273 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
138 To preserve the defendant's rights as regards time to answer, service
of process will not be deemed complete until ten days after actual filing.
Ibid.
1' N.Y. Judicial Council, Tenth Annual Report, 265 (1944).
140 Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952).
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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

163

which gives rise to the main claim."4" This position has recently
been confirmed in County of Nassau v. Wolfe,' 42 where the county
sued for damages resulting from the collision of one of its motor
vehicles with the defendant's automobile. Defendant counterclaimed for damages to his car. His counterclaim was dismissed
because he had not notified the county within ninety days of the
accident. The court recognized that the county had actual notice
of the accident, but justified the dismissal on the ground that
failure to notify deprived the county of an authorized examination
of the complainant. 43
The effect of this holding will be felt in those cases where an
individual would prefer not to sue either because the damages
recoverable are minimal, or because the question of liability is close.
The holding of the present case gives the municipality an unwarranted
advantage in this situation. It can wait until ninety days have
elapsed and then bring suit without risking liability on a counterclaim. Even if the municipality seeks a settlement, its immunity
gives it a superior bargaining position. It is questioned whether
this discrimination was intended by the legislature. But until a
different rule is adopted, an individual should file a notice of claim
regardless of his intention not to sue.

141 Broome County v. Binghamton Taxicab Co., 190 Misc. 925, 75 N.Y.S.2d
423 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1947). The court offered no rationale, but
merely relied on the authority of two cases treating analogous situations.
Bank of United States v. Frost, 142 Misc. 589, 255 N.Y. Supp. 763 (Munic.
Ct. N.Y. 1932) (involving a different cause of action); see City of New
York v. Seidman, 138 Misc. 524, 246 N.Y. Supp. 393 (App. T. 1st Dep't
1930) (involving the same cause of action).
142 51 Misc. 2d 848, 273 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
143 "Wherever a notice of claim is filed . . . [a municipality] shall have
the right to demand an examination of the claimant ...
" N.Y. GEN.
MUNIc. LAw §50-h(1).

